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The provision of insurance for the poor, covering a 
variety of risks, could well be a key milestone in the 
fight against poverty. In richer economies, insurance 
achieved through broad public action and 
appropriately developed private mechanisms has 
fundamentally changed the lives of poor people. The 
difficulty in developing countries, however, is that 
insurance markets are limited, as (often) is the 
capacity of public agencies to provide sufficient 
protection. Much experimentation has occurred in the 
provision of health insurance, and microfinance 
institutions have begun to take more interest in 
insurance, providing coverage for risks like crop 
failure resulting from drought and loss of income due 
to illness or accident as part of their overall service 
delivery. The focus of this brief is the design of 
insurance schemes for the poor in some of the 
poorest settings of the developing world, taking 
potential synergies and pitfalls into account.  
The Nature of Risk in Developing Countries 
Risk is pervasive in developing countries. The 
standard household risks of fire, theft, 
unemployment, sickness, and mortality are all more 
severe for poor families in developing countries, and 
rural households, most of which derive their 
livelihoods from the land, face the additional risks of 
droughts, floods, and pests and diseases affecting 
their crops and livestock. Insurance provision is still 
limited, and state-provided social security or more 
basic social safety nets are often limited or 
unavailable for particular widespread disasters. 
  Richer families have reasonable access to 
insurance alternatives, such as credit and substantial 
savings, and while these are generally not options for 
poorer families, it is well known that such families do 
employ relatively sophisticated mechanisms to 
manage and cope with risk. They tend to diversify 
their crops and income-generating activities, often 
incorporating nonfarm activities into their income 
streams and even having family members migrate to 
reduce the household’s overall exposure to risk. 
Where possible, they build up savings for 
precautionary purposes, often in the form of livestock 
or other liquid assets. Importantly, they also engage 
in informal mutual support networks in which 
assistance is provided in the event that a member 
experiences some form of shock. Nevertheless, given 
the variety and severity of risks to be dealt with, 
shocks inevitably have serious welfare consequences. 
  This is well illustrated by evidence from Ethiopia, 
where rural households face a considerable risk of 
drought. For example, about half the households 
interviewed in 2004 for a rural panel data survey in 15 
communities across the country reported that they 
had faced serious hardship due to drought in the 
preceding five years, while around a quarter of the 
sample reported hardship resulting from illness, and a 
similar number reported problems related to illness. 
Despite a relatively widespread, foreign aid–supported 
safety net to cope with drought and increased 
investment in health services, these shocks continue 
to cause significant welfare costs. The consumption 
levels of those reporting a serious drought, for 
example, were found to be 16 percent lower than 
those of families not affected, and shocks from illness 
appeared to have similar average impacts. Further, the 
costs were not just short term: in the sample, it was 
found that those who had suffered considerably in the 
1984–85 famine—the most severe famine in recent 
history—were still experiencing lower growth rates in 
consumption in the 1990s, a period of overall 
recovery, compared with those who were not seriously 
affected by the famine. In this way, risk should be 
seen as a cause of persistent poverty, in that shocks 
cause serious losses of physical and human capital 
assets. The presence of risk also tends to induce 
poorer households to become risk averse, even at the 
expense of potential returns: for example, they may 
choose to grow low-returning but safe crops and to 
avoid committing resources to more productive capital 
in order to preserve the liquidity of their asset base. 
The Characteristics of Insurance to  
Meet the Needs of the Poor 
Insurance interventions designed to meet the needs 
of the poor would need to take into account the 
surrounding environment, particularly other 
interventions affecting risk and the way potential 
consumers respond to risk. The use of (micro)credit 
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Box 1—Funeral Associations in Ethiopia 
Most Ethiopians are members of one or more iddirs, which are funeral associations commonly found in both urban and rural 
areas. Iddirs traditionally offer their members insurance with benefits paid either in cash or in kind (such as in the form of 
funeral arrangements) in the event that a family member dies. Members usually pay a monthly premium, although there are 
specific mechanisms to ensure that even the poorest are included. In recent years, it has been observed that many of these 
groups have expanded their insurance to cover a number of different kinds of risk, including household- and fire-related 
damages, and personal injury and illness. These groups are typically local, so covariate risks cannot be insured. Some efforts 
have been taken to build on these groups to increase insurance coverage. A number of urban iddirs in Addis Ababa have joined 
forces, effectively broadening the risk pool. A pilot scheme offering health insurance to iddirs is also under way. 
 
is expanding in most countries of the developing 
world, and in poorer settings schemes are often 
group based so as to provide increased incentives 
and possibilities for enforcement, thereby 
economizing on information and transaction costs. 
Much effort is also being expended on developing 
better safety nets targeted to the poor, although 
usually with limited insurance provision beyond large-
scale disasters. Further, in most communities in the 
world, people have long collaborated to provide 
mutual support in the event of crises, forming 
networks based on well-defined extended families 
and social groups. Such networks may well be 
suitable for handling idiosyncratic risk—meaning risks 
that affect only a few members at a given point in 
time. Scope exists, however, to strengthen these 
networks via interventions to increase the risk pool as 
a means of guaranteeing sustainability. As it stands, 
these networks are not capable of handling covariate 
risk (meaning risks that simultaneously affect many 
members of a network) or catastrophic (and, hence, 
very expensive) risk. 
The Scope of Insurance 
It should be noted that many types of risk are not 
easily insurable, simply because they cannot be 
actuarially priced—as is the case with many of the 
more common risks in developing countries because 
even basic data on health, longevity, and climate are 
often largely incomplete—or because the risks are 
unknown, as in the case of rare natural disasters or 
catastrophes. Second, rather than insurance, risk 
reduction and management may be the relevant 
priority response for many types of risk. The obvious 
examples are conflict and crime, but others include 
water management and environmental protection in 
the event of drought and soil erosion in certain areas. 
  Insurance provision also suffers from serious 
informational and enforcement problems—possibly 
even to a greater degree than those faced by credit 
markets. Because it is difficult to observe the exact 
risk profile of each member of the population, 
insurance may attract those facing relatively higher 
risk on average, leading to adverse selection 
problems affecting the sustainability of a scheme. 
Further, people may actually start taking more risks 
once insured (the so-called moral hazard problem). 
Premium collection costs can be high, as can be the 
cost of verifying that certain insured risks actually 
occurred. These types of problems provide 
explanations for the limited development of insurance 
markets in poor communities. And since any scheme 
undertaken by the public sector or a 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) would face 
similar problems, there is a strong rationale for 
improving the design of insurance mechanisms in 
efforts to economize on these costs. 
  Another set of problems complicates matters 
even further: experimental evidence suggests that 
people’s perceptions of risks tend to deviate 
considerably from observed distributions of risk; for 
example, relatively high probability events tend to be 
underestimated. Furthermore, people find it hard to 
attach any probabilities to many possible events.  
  These considerations promote certain “rules of 
thumb” when it comes to designing mechanisms for 
insurance delivery. Partnerships between private- 
sector insurance companies, which have the much-
needed expertise in the field, and NGOs and possibly 
even public agencies, which are in a unique position 
to reach the targeted poor sectors of communities, 
are likely to be the most fruitful. 
Developing and Designing Interventions  
for Poor Constituents 
When it comes to specific insurance interventions, it 
makes considerable sense to attempt to build on 
existing groups, especially those with developed 
forms of insurance provision and mutual support. In 
Europe, much of the provision of social security 
historically began with health and unemployment 
insurance initially developed within cooperatives or 
trade unions; with public intervention, these 
mechanisms eventually grew to become fully fledged 
social insurance schemes. In developing countries, 
there is ample evidence of functioning self-help 
groups (for example, in India) and cooperatives. 
There are also more traditional, but no less 
sophisticated, institutions such as funeral 
associations, which provide cash and in-kind funeral 
benefits for members and their families (see Box 1). 
Importantly, these schemes tend to be highly 
inclusive of the poorest segments of the community. 
Existing groups such as these could be strengthened  3
Box 2—Rainfall Insurance 
Rainfall insurance involves products that cover typical losses from low or high rainfall across particular geographical areas based 
on predetermined payouts, thereby eliminating the need to estimate individual losses. Such products are highly attractive to 
insurers because they enable them to sidestep the problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and verification costs, which 
have bedeviled crop insurance schemes across the world. In the developing world, trials of rainfall insurance products have 
been undertaken in various areas of Ethiopia, India, Malawi, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Peru, and the Ukraine. 
  BASIX has experimented with rainfall insurance in Andhra Pradesh, India, since 2003. The findings of its controlled study 
illustrate some of the key problems of indexed insurance products designed for the poor: despite being offered in areas with 
serious drought risk, only a small number of eligible households bought the insurance (4.6 percent). All evidence indicates that 
those who bought the insurance were wealthier, better educated, and more able to withstand the shock of drought than the 
average farmer in the area. Why, then, did the poorer farmers forego the insurance? Evidence suggests that they either did not 
understand the product or did not trust the product or its provider. It is worth noting, however, that on average—despite the 
insurer-friendly indexed design of the product—insurance premiums were around three times higher than the expected payouts. 
Work in Malawi has returned similar conclusions on uptake problems, although a clear need exists for further exploration of the 
subject. 
by providing broader risk-pooling as well as by 
offering protection for additional kinds of risk, most 
notably covariate risk, which they are not currently in 
a position to underwrite. 
  Working with groups has considerable 
advantages. First, it eliminates or at least 
considerably reduces the problem of adverse 
selection, as existing groups will have already 
internalized such risks. Relatedly, dealing with groups 
would considerably reduce monitoring costs because 
the insurance agency would only have to monitor the 
group portfolio, leaving the association to monitor 
the individuals within the group. Next, provided that 
groups were chosen to focus on the poorer segments 
of society, targeting could also be devolved to the 
level of the group, society, or association. An 
additional benefit of focusing on existing groups is 
that mutual support systems would already be in 
place within the group, making it easy to build on 
existing informal schemes with complementary 
activities. If only individual members within these 
groups were targeted rather than the group as a 
whole, the newfound protection of those individuals 
could well induce them to withdraw their support to 
existing networks, possibly leaving some with even 
less protection than before. 
  Targeting insurance to groups, just as to 
individuals, requires the careful design of products. 
Different risks have different specific informational or 
verification problems, which should be taken into 
account in this process. For example, health insurance 
schemes primarily tend to suffer from adverse 
selection problems; property or fire insurance are 
strongly affected by moral hazard problems; and 
insurance against crop failure suffers from moral 
hazard, as well as loss verification, problems. These 
risks are often also highly covariate, requiring a much 
larger risk pool. Life insurance has fewer of these 
problems and is typically observed to emerge early in 
new insurance markets. For example, the Indian Self-
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) has begun to 
offer life insurance to its members. 
  In recent years, a number of innovative products 
have been developed relevant to the developing 
world. Indexed products have been developed for 
rainfall insurance, in which fixed payouts are made 
when local rainfall levels fall below particular trigger 
levels. These products are calibrated to cover typical 
losses from low or high rainfall across particular 
geographical areas, and predetermined payouts are 
provided to customers, without the need for specific 
individual losses to be verified and estimated. Such 
products have been piloted in India and Malawi, for 
example (see Box 2). They overcome costly 
verification problems, as well as all standard 
informational problems such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection. 
  Designing products is nevertheless relatively easy 
compared with the task of ensuring considerable 
uptake of insurance. Studies investigating the 
hypothetical demand for insurance consistently find 
that demand is high, but when insurance products are 
piloted, such as in India and Malawi, uptake is rarely 
swift or high. In insurance companies, this 
phenomenon is well known, such that it is often said 
that “insurance is always sold and never bought.” 
Explaining this is harder, although the relatively high 
up-front cost of the insurance premium for some 
people may well explain their reluctance. It could also 
have to do with the fact that insurance is a difficult 
concept for most people to understand, and taking up 
an insurance product can often itself be seen to 
increase uncertainty, given its cost and its novelty. 
  For insurance to be successfully adopted, 
prospective clients need to be educated on the issue, 
and more research is needed to improve our 
understanding of why uptake is often low. These 
additional costs will increase the overall cost of 
insurance, but low uptake will reduce the benefits, 
viability, and ultimately the sustainability of insurance 
schemes, defeating their purpose. These realities 
may offer an additional incentive for a group 
approach, given that established groups have   4 
established forms of mutual support, and this may 
lower additional educational and marketing costs. 
Prospective Effects on Other Markets 
Insurance may also affect the functioning of other 
markets. Specifically, one well-known reason why 
private credit markets function poorly or are poorly 
developed in the poorer regions of developing 
countries relates to enforcement problems associated 
with repayment. Offering insurance in such settings is 
rather analogous to offering bankruptcy protection. 
Bankruptcy laws provide a limit to enforced 
repayment, encouraging people to take more risk 
than is prudent. As a result, fewer people may be 
offered credit in the presence of bankruptcy laws than 
would be the case without them. Offering insurance 
against serious losses has a similar impact: it provides 
a limit to the “damage” caused by undertaking risky 
activities, but this increased risk-taking may in turn 
result in a reduction in the overall amount of credit 
offered. In short, insurance for broad income risks 
has the potential to crowd out credit. 
  Similarly, offering insurance to individuals as part 
of group-based credit schemes has the potential to 
undermine the credit scheme. These schemes 
economize on information and monitoring by creating 
incentives for members to ensure that they repay 
their loans, and a big factor in this is ensuring that 
they don’t take on very high risks. Introducing 
insurance changes these incentives, running the risk 
of undermining the credit scheme. The implication is 
that in order to avoid undermining credit provision, 
potential gains would need to be incorporated into 
credit–insurance linkages—for example, by ensuring 
that contracts optimally internalized the different 
incentive, monitoring, and enforcement problems. 
One way to do this would be to offer credit with 
mandatory insurance, rather than allowing some to 
opt out of insurance. 
  Going a step further, insurance could be linked to 
the broader social safety net agenda. Social safety 
nets are arguably a crude form of insurance that 
offer benefits at times of crisis. A key difference is 
that the benefits are usually not well defined or 
known in advance, and the recipients have limited 
certainty that they will receive benefits and no 
contractual enforcement powers. For social safety 
nets to operate like insurance they would need to be 
credibly guaranteed. They should also be seen as an 
alternative in the event of the failure of credit and 
insurance markets, and one of a number of risk 
management strategies available to the poor. It is 
also important to recognize that they have the 
potential to undermine existing mutual support and 
credit schemes via the crowding-out problems 
previously discussed. 
Concluding Comments 
In conclusion, successfully devising insurance 
schemes to meet the needs of the poor requires a 
holistic approach that considers the risk behavior 
of users; the surrounding environment; and the 
potential side effects, such as on credit markets. 
Costs and benefits need to be taken into account, 
along with potential trade-offs and 
complementarities. 
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